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Abstract 
 
Governance networks ebb and flow, become dormant or extinct, only to resurface with new members, and 
names, forms, or boundaries.  The paper uses a systematic qualitative analysis (e.g., coding, cross-case 
analysis) of data from 6 watershed governance efforts in the United States – Delaware Inland Bays, Lake 
Tahoe, Narragansett Bay, Salt Ponds, Tampa Bay, and Tillamook Bay – to examine these developmental 
processes.  The study’s objective was to develop theory grounded in these data to explain the linkages 
between network structures and processes. 
 
The paper describes a four stage life-cycle model.  Each stage represents a cluster of developmental 
challenges related to sustaining the health and useful life of a governance network.  The activation stage is 
the turbulent period of network formation.  The collectivity stage is exemplified by high member cohesion 
and reliable network processes.  The institutionalization stage marks the solidification of network 
processes.  The final stage is stability, decline, reorientation, or recreation, which recognizes the various 
paths mature networks follow.  The model’s central feature is the convergence on a configuration of rules 
(formal and informal) that create the social architecture that structures network processes.  These relatively 
long periods of convergence are punctuated by reorientations involving relatively rapid periods of 
discontinuous change that alter character of the network’s structure and processes.  Recreations are also 
possible that involve the additional shift in core values.   
 
The analysis identifies three interrelated sets of rules that interact to form this social architecture by 
building on the work of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues. Some rules are crafted deliberately.  Others 
emerge as members confront developmental challenges or get imposed upon the network by funders, 
government agencies, or legislators.  Two sets of boundary rules are particularly important – member rules 
and strategy rules.  Decision rules create the processes members use to make decisions and include rules 
related to preference aggregation, distribution of power, distribution of roles or responsibilities, and the 
distribution of participation in decision making.  As networks evolve, coordination rules emerge to specify 
resource exchanges, monitor behavior, enforce agreements, and resolve disputes.  The analysis also found 
evidence of at least two reorientation (recreation) in each watershed, with examples of changes occurring 
both endogenously in response to self-organizing processes and exogenously as network actors responded 
to incentives provided by federal funding agencies. 
 
The social architecture is important because governance networks, like other organizational forms, 
are a functional enterprise with a useful life.  The social architecture provides coordination, 
direction and shared purpose to network processes.  However, once established, it can be costly 
and difficult to change.  Similarly, once the network’s useful life has passed, it is time to disband, 
re-orient, or re-create the network to allow their resources to be redeployed in more productive 
public purposes.  Accordingly, framework presented in the paper identifies important design 
choices that members should carefully consider during the development of governance networks. 
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Life-Cycles and Developmental Processes in Watershed Partnerships:  
Sustaining the Useful Life of Governance Networks 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Governance networks that reflect principles of self-organization are used to address 
societal problems around the world.  This is particularly true in many watersheds, river basins, 
and coastal areas where problem solving capacity is widely dispersed among actors at different 
levels of government, none of which can solve problems by acting alone (Bressers et al. 1995, 4; 
Imperial et al. 2017).  Governance refers to the institutions and resources used to achieve 
direction, control, and coordination between individuals (and organizations) who possess varying 
degrees of autonomy in order to advance joint objectives across the network as a whole (Provan 
& Kenis 2008, 231; Lynn et al. 2000; Frederickson 1996).  Networks involve more than the 
interactions among individuals or organizations.  Networks are structures of interdependence 
involving multiple organizations (and individuals) that exhibit some degree of structural stability 
due to formal or informal linkages and relationships (O’Toole 1997; Aldrich & Whetten 1981).  
Therefore, collaborative governance results in self-governing enterprises because no single 
organization typically has the authority to direct all the actions of member organizations 
(Mandell & Keast 2007; Klijn & Koppenjam 2000).   
 
Unfortunately, there is little research that informs our understanding of the structure of 
collaborative governance processes as they develop and change over time (e.g., Heikkila and 
Gerlak 2016, 2005; Gerlak & Heikkila 2006, 2007; Imperial, et al. 2016a, 2017; Schoon, et al. 
2016; Provan, et al. 2009).  The dearth of research is easy to explain.  Collaborative governance 
efforts often span several decades or more, which complicates data collection and requires a 
sustained research commitment.  Researchers also tend to gravitate towards “successful” 
programs so there is little understanding of situations where collaborations cease to exist.  
Moreover, much of the research is cross-sectional in nature, which limits our understanding of 
developmental processes.   
 
This paper is designed to address these short-comings and contributes to the literature by 
improving our understanding of the developmental processes that give rise to a configuration of 
shared rules and norms that create the social architecture that provides “structure” to network 
processes.  This shared social architecture is what allows for coordination and direction in the 
absence of a centralized authority.  The term social architecture draws attention to the fact that 
rules and norms exist but may be hidden in the sense that network members do not give much 
conscious thought to the rules that influence and guide their collective behavior.  Similarly, 
people give little thought to the physical construction of a house until it is time to renovate the 
structure.  Architecture is a useful metaphor in other ways.  Just as an architect begins with 
concepts and rough sketches, the early stages of network governance are fluid as different 
designs are considered.  During early the early developmental stages, members try different 
combinations of rules as they determine the goals, functions, or services the network might 
provide.  Eventually, agreement coalesces around the final plans used to build and create the 
structure.   
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The architectural design process is rarely top-down and tends to be iterative, with trade-
offs that balance the competing uses and functions of a structure.  The details of the final 
architectural plan are important because the structure’s function is profoundly influenced by its 
form.  Similarly, once you decide to change its function, it might become costly to change its 
structure.  In practice, it is often cheaper to buy or build a new structure to better accommodate 
the new uses.  Moreover, while some network members can design governance structures from 
the ground up, others live and work within structures that are at least in part designed by external 
actors because of some mandate or conditions of funding support (Imperial et al. 2016b; Huxham 
and Vangen 2000, 1166). 
 
The social architecture associated with collaborative governance must be understood in 
the context of the developmental process that gives rise to the rule structure.  Collaborative 
governance is inherently dynamic.  Structures “ebb and flow, become dormant or extinct, and 
resurface with old and new participants under new names and organizational forms” (Genskow 
& Born 2006).  Thus, governance networks undergo profound change when viewed over time 
(Imperial, et. al. 2017; Genskow & Born 2006).  Accordingly, the challenge for these 
partnerships is to develop a social architecture that allows them to sustain a healthy and useful 
life to generate value.   
 
The concept of a healthy and useful life is used in place of more traditional notions of 
performance to draw attention to the functional and purposeful nature of collaborative 
governance.  While the collaborative process may be self-organizing, it is not self- executing.  It 
requires constant nurturing to maintain a healthy and useful life (Imperial, et al. 2016a).  
Nurturing implies the gentle continuous care of things like fragile plants or small children.  
However, nurturing an overgrown garden back to health require drastic tactics like chopping 
down excess growth, pulling out dead plants, bringing in new topsoil, and adding fertilizer to 
make the soil healthy (Imperial, et al. 2016a).  The same is true in networks (Huxham 2003, 
417).  Nurturing is often gentle and continuous, however, there are times where fundamental 
transformations of the social architecture are needed to sustain the network’s useful life 
(Imperial, et al. 2016a). 
 
Objectives of the Study 
 
Understanding the developmental processes that give rise the institutional architecture is 
important to provide sound advice to managers seeking to develop and nurture healthy and useful 
collaborative governance arrangements such as those found in many watersheds.  To that end, 
the paper examines the following research questions: 
 
 To what extent are collaborative governance processes self-initiated? 
 What rules comprise the social architecture of the watershed partnerships? 
 What are the developmental processes and trajectories that that occur due to 
change processes? 
 Is there a linkage between the useful life and change processes? 
 
To answer these questions, the paper relies on the qualitative analysis of four longitudinal 
watershed governance case studies dating back many decades.  Each case consists of a series of 
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watershed partnerships that ebb and flow, change, and at times disappear revealing the myriad of 
developmental trajectories and change processes that occur.  The collaborative governance 
efforts also vary considerably in terms of whether they had healthy and useful lives.   
 
Several models of the developmental processes in collaborative governance networks 
have been proposed (e.g., Sydow 2004; Sydow et al. 2009; Sandstrom et al. 2015; Harbron 2003; 
Dwyer, et al. 1987; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Popp, et al. 2014; Waddock 1989).  Researchers 
seem to agree that network processes go through several developmental stages with initial stages 
focusing on building relationships and later stages focus on stability and getting things done 
(Popp, et al. 2014; Mandell & Keast 2008; Forsyth 1999).  This study extends the model 
proposed by Imperial and others (Imperial, et al. 2016a).  Their four-stage model is based loosely 
on ecological theories of organization and draws attention to the challenges during each stage of 
network development (Cameron & Whetten, 1981, 1983; Quinn & Cameron, 1983; Whetten 
1987; Miller & Friesen 1983, 1984; Smith et al., 1985; Hanks et al., 1993) [Table 1 & Figure 1].   
 
The activation stage reflects the turbulent period during the formation of a collaborative 
process as different combinations of rules are considered (Imperial et al. 2016a).  When first 
activated, the network is a fragmented and unstable social system (Mandell and Keast 2008).  
Network processes are fluid.  Members come and go, and different strategies and purposes are 
considered.  The cost and risk of change is low because members have not invested significant 
time developing rules, routines, and processes (Katz and Gartner 1988).  While the social 
architecture remains somewhat ill-defined, shared norms and values start to emerge that 
distinguish the “network” from its members (Imperial et al. 2016a).   
 
The somewhat turbulent activation period eventually gives way to an increasingly stable 
collectivity stage exemplified by stable membership and high member cohesion (Imperial et al. 
2016a). Network processes are shaped largely by personal relationships at the beginning of the 
stage as decisions about the rules and social norms are negotiated and emerge as a by-product of 
network processes.  However, by the end of the stage, there is growing resistance to change as 
the social architecture is solidified and interest shifts towards achieving the purposes that 
motivate participation in the partnership ((Imperial et al. 2016a; Head 2008).   
 
The institutionalization stage marks the solidification or convergence on a configuration 
or rules or social architecture that shape and constrain network processes (Imperial et al. 2016a).  
Network processes and the resources needed to sustain them are stable.  The focus now shifts to 
producing goods and services efficiently.  Participants may not need to meet as frequently as 
they have worked together for some time and the social architecture now coordinates joint 
action.  Partnerships begin to codify and institutionalize key aspects of the institutional 
architecture (e.g., rules, routines, and procedures) using formal mechanisms (e.g., by-laws, work 
plans, plans, membership directories, websites, and other program documents) to reinforce the 
network’s identity, lessen reliance on personal relationships, and socialize new participants to the 
collaborative processes (Imperial et al. 2016a). Accordingly, the emphasis is on creating a social 
architecture that is efficient and ‘built to last’ (Head 2008).  
 
The final stage, stability, decline, or change, recognizes the various paths that occur in a 
mature collaborative governance processes (Imperial et al. 2016a). Some collaborative process  
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Table 1: Key Differences in the Stages of Network Development 
 
  
Stages of Network Development 
 
 Activation Collectivity Institutionalization 
Stability, Decline,  
or Change 
Useful 
Life 
 Does the network 
exist? 
 Is there some public 
value to creating the 
network? 
 Does the network 
produce a good or 
service using a 
reliable process? 
 Does the perceived 
value of the goods 
and services exceed 
the costs? 
 Could the resources 
contributed to 
network processes 
be deployed better?  
Emphasis 
 Determine if the 
network should 
exist 
 Build relationships 
 Establish core 
values and mission 
 Forge a cohesive 
whole from diverse 
members 
 Create a stable 
network process 
 Institutionalize the 
social architecture 
 Improve efficiency 
of network 
processes 
 Incremental change 
to improve 
performance  
 External threats and 
performance issues 
lead to 
Reorientation 
Membership 
and 
Social 
System 
 Unstable at first 
 Stable processes and 
stable membership 
soon emerge 
 Membership 
stabilizes 
 Cohesive processes 
create stable system 
 Heavily dependent 
on personal 
relationships 
 Very stable 
 While relationships 
remain important, 
the process is no 
longer dependent on 
individuals 
 New members 
quickly socialized 
 May be stable 
 Excessive member 
turnover, declining 
commitments, 
performance issues 
create instability.   
 Reorientations 
create instability 
Commitment 
 Membership is 
viewed to advance 
individual or 
organizational goals 
 High personal 
commitment to the 
network and its 
shared goals 
 Individually based 
commitments 
become 
organizational 
 Commitments 
correlate with 
collective 
performance 
 Members look to 
redeploy resources 
to new problems 
Resistance 
to change 
 Very low 
 Frequent changes as 
members search for 
appropriate 
processes 
 Growing resistance 
to change as the 
need to produce 
goods and services 
takes hold 
 High resistance to 
change 
 Mostly incremental 
change to reduce 
costs and improve 
performance 
 High resistance to 
change 
 Resistance remains 
high in the face of 
threats and poor 
performance 
Network 
Leadership 
 
 Heavily reliant on 
collaborative leaders 
to initiate network 
processes 
 Collaborative 
leaders coordinate 
and facilitate 
network processes 
 Leadership is 
increasingly shared 
by network 
processes 
 Leadership is 
distributed and 
shared because of 
network processes 
and structure 
 As founders retire or 
leave, new leaders 
cultivated and 
activated 
 Leadership is 
distributed and 
shared because of 
structure and 
processes 
 Collaborative 
leaders are needed 
to guide 
Reorientations 
 
 
Source: Imperial, et al. 2016a 
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Figure 1: Life Cycle Model of Network Governance Processes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Imperial, et al. 2016a 
 
 
 
 
remain relatively useful and productive for some time with only slight declines in health if it can 
sustain the resources needed for survival.  Others decline rapidly because participants design 
poor structures or cannot sustain the resources or commitments to achieve its purposes.  
Members also make changes to the social architecture. Reorientations involve rapid and 
discontinuous change, which fundamentally alter the character and fabric of the network’s 
structure and processes by changing rules, which returns participants to confront the challenges 
in the collectivity and institutionalization stages.  Recreations involve additional and much larger 
shifts in core members, purposes, and values, which returns members to the activation stage.  
These changes are more complicated and take longer to achieve.   
 
While reorientations and recreations occur at any time for many reasons, they are 
depicted in the final stage of Figure 1 to emphasize the convergence process and emphasize the 
notion of punctuated equilibrium (Imperial et al. 2016a; Tushman and Romanelli 1985).  What is 
converged upon is the configuration of shared rules and norms that create the social architecture 
or “structure” of the collaborative processes.  Long periods of convergence are punctuated by 
relatively rapid reorientations or recreations (Imperial et al. 2016a; Tushman and Romanelli 
1985). While the last stage of life is decline and death, there is no reason to presuppose that all 
networks die.  Similarly, others die untimely deaths or survive well past their useful lives.  Much 
like life, death can occur at any time for a myriad of reasons (Imperial et al 2016a, 136).   
 
The important features of each stage are summarized in Table 1 and are described in 
more detail elsewhere (Imperial et al. 2016a).  While the stages suggest a sequential or linear 
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developmental process, that need not be the case.  The developmental processes associated with 
collaborative governance are iterative in nature because takes time to develop communication, 
trust, commitment, understanding, and outcomes (Johnston et al. 2010; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Jap 
and Anderson 2007; Mandell and Keast 2008).  Moreover, network members can confront 
challenges from different stages simultaneously (Imperial et al. 2016a, 136; Whetten 1987; 
Tushman & Romanelli 1985).   
 
Data & Methods 
 
Given the complexity of collaborative processes and the lack of precisely defined theories 
about their life-cycles, the study is largely developmental and focuses on developing theory 
grounded in the data and the literature (Yin 1994; Agranoff & Radin 1991; Strauss & Corbin 
1990; Glaser & Strauss 1967).  This study relies on the analysis of four longitudinal case studies 
examining watershed governance networks in: Inland Bays (DE); Narragansett Bay (RI, MA); 
Tampa Bay (FL); and, Tillamook Bay (OR).  Table 2 summarizes some of the key characteristics 
of each watershed.  Each watershed is an estuary of national significance and voluntarily 
participates in the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) National Estuary Program 
(NEP).  They vary in geographic size, population, and institutional complexity.  They include 
urban and rural settings and participants address a wide range of environmental problems.   
 
The development of these longitudinal cases originated with a study conducted for the 
National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) that collected data from field interviews 
with more than 160 individuals, archival records, and the direct observation of events and 
meetings during site visits (Imperial & Hennessey 2000).  In subsequent years, periodic 
interviews with key informants and supplemental collection of archival materials allowed the 
researchers to continue monitoring the life-cycle of these governance efforts as they have ebbed  
and flowed over time with varying degrees of success and continued to experience additional 
reorientations and recreations.   
 
Systematic qualitative techniques such as coding were used to examine these data.  Codes 
were derived inductively and deductively from these data and generated based on a start list 
derived from previous research.  Cross-case analysis was used to deepen the understanding of 
collaborative processes and determine the extent to which findings extended beyond individual 
cases.  The basic approach was one of synthesizing interpretations and looking for themes that 
cut across cases (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  Examining different data sources also allowed 
triangulation to be used to improve the validity of the study’s findings (Yin, 1994).  These 
methods and case histories are documented in more detail elsewhere (Imperial, et al. 2017; 
Imperial 2005a, 2005b; Imperial & Hennessey 2000; Imperial 2000a, 2000b; Imperial, et al. 
2000; Imperial & Summers 2000; Robadue, et al. 2016).   
 
The cross-case analysis reported here focused primarily on two areas.  The first identifies 
the unique collaborative governance efforts occurring in each watershed.  Excluded from 
consideration were the large number of operational level collaborations (e.g., collaborative 
projects) that occurred in all the watersheds such as those examined by Imperial (2005a).  
Similarly, the analysis did not focus on the sub-basin level collaborations (e.g., smaller scale 
watershed efforts) that are nested within the larger geographic area and occur with some  
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Table 2: Comparison of the Four Case Study Watersheds 
 
 Inland Bays Narragansett Bay Tampa Bay Tillamook Bay 
 
Physical Environment 
    
Water body Inland Bays (DE) Narragansett Bay 
(RI, MA) 
Tampa Bay (FL) Tillamook Bay (OR) 
Size of watershed 300 square miles 1,705 square miles 2,200 square miles 597 square miles 
Population (2017) 225,000a 1,950,000 2,700,000 26,500 a 
Focal problem(s) Nutrient loading None Nutrient loading & 
seagrass loss 
Shellfish closures, 
sedimentation, & 
endangered species 
Sources/causes of 
problem(s) 
Chicken farms, 
Septic systems, point 
sources, & 
stormwater 
Diverse sources & 
causes 
nutrient loading from 
diverse sources & 
habitat loss 
bacterial loading & 
sedimentation from 
agricult., forestry, & 
urban sources 
 
Institutional 
Environment 
    
Jurisdictional 
complexity 
Low High Medium – High Low – Medium 
Level of conflict Medium High. Low Low 
Current Collaborative 
Effort 
Center for the Inland 
Bays (CIB) 
Narragansett Bay 
Estuary Program 
(NBEP) 
Tampa Bay Estuary 
Program (TBEP) 
Tillamook Estuaries 
Partnership (TEP) 
Organizational 
Arrangement 
Nonprofit 
Organization 
Independent program 
in govt. organization 
Alliance of local 
governments 
Nonprofit 
Organization 
Institutionalization Legislation forming 
nonprofit/by-
laws/CCMP/other 
documents & 
website 
CCMP/other 
documents & 
website 
Interlocal 
Agreement/by-laws/ 
CCMP/other 
documents & 
website 
501 (c)3 
incorporation/by-
laws/CCMP/other 
documents & website 
Primary Funding 
Sources 
Federal, state Federal Federal, state, 
regional, & local 
Federal 
Funding 
amount/stability 
Low/Medium Low/Low High/High Medium/Medium 
Shared goals or targets Limited Limited Many Limited 
Scope of collaborative 
activity 
Medium Low High Low-Medium 
Monitoring/Reporting Medium Low High Medium 
 
Note: Assessments of high, medium and low are based on comparisons among the four programs.   
a Measured at the county level 
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Table 3: Collaborative Governance Efforts in the Four Watersheds 
 
 
Collaborative Governance Effort 
 
Begin 
 
End 
 
Initialization 
 
End Stage 
Health & 
Usefulness 
Inland Bays (DE)      
Environmental Study of Rehoboth, Indian River 
and Assawoman Bay (IB1) 
 
1969 1969 Self-Initiated Work 
Complete 
Low 
Coastal Sussex Water Quality Program (CWA 
Section 208) (IB2) 
 
1972 1981 External: 
Mandate 
Death Low 
Inland Bays Study Group (IBSG) (IB3) 
 
1981 1983 Self-Initiated Untimely 
Death 
 
High 
Decisions for Delaware: Sea Grant Looks at the 
Inland Bays (IB4) 
 
1982 1983 Self-Initiated Work 
Complete 
Med. 
Governor’s Task Force on the Inland Bays 
(GTFIB) (IB5a) 
 
1983 1984 External: 
Mandate 
Recreation: 
IBMC 
High 
Inland Bays Monitoring Committee (IBMC) 
(IB5b) 
1984 1988 External: 
Mandate 
 
Untimely 
Death 
High 
Delaware Inland Bays Estuary Program (DIBEP) 
(IB6a) 
1988 1995 External: 
Incentive 
 
Recreation Low – Med. 
(Perspective) 
Center for the Inland Bays (CIB) (IB6b) 1994 1995 Self-initiated: 
Constraints 
 
Reorientation Low – Med. 
(Perspective) 
Center for the Inland Bays (CIB) (IB6c) 1995 2015 Self-initiated: 
Constraints 
 
Reorientation Med. - High 
(Perspective) 
Center for the Inland Bays (CIB) (IB6d) 2015 Ongoing Self-initiated: 
Constraints 
Stable Med. - High 
(Perspective) 
Narragansett Bay (RI. MA)      
New England Interstate Water Pollution Control 
Commission (NB1) 
1948 Ongoing External: 
Mandate 
 
Slow 
Decline 
Med. 
New England River Basins Commission (NB2) 1967 1981 External: 
Mandate 
 
Untimely 
Death 
High 
RI Areawide Water Quality Management Plan 
Section 208 Comprehensive Plan (NB3) 
 
1972 1981 External: 
Mandate 
Death Low 
Narragansett Bay Project (NBP) (NB4a) 1985 1993 External: 
Incentive 
 
Reorientation Low 
Narragansett Bay Project (NBP) (NB4b) 1993 1995 Self-initiated: 
Constraints 
 
Recreation: 
NBEP 
Low 
Narragansett Bay Estuary Program (NBEP) 
(NB4c) 
1995 2012 Self-initiated: 
Constraints 
 
Reorientation Low 
Narragansett Bay Estuary Program (NBEP) 
(NB4d) 
2012 Ongoing External: 
Incentive 
 
Stable Low 
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Table 3: Collaborative Governance Efforts in the Four Watersheds (Cont.) 
 
 
Collaborative Governance Effort 
 
Begin 
 
End 
 
Initialization 
 
End Stage 
Health & 
Usefulness 
Tampa Bay (FL)      
Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council (TBRPC) 
(TB1a) 
1962 Ongoing Self-initiated Reorientation: 
ABM 
 
Med. 
Tampa Bay Study Commission (TB2) 1983 1984 External: 
Mandate 
 
Work 
Complete 
Med. – High 
TRBPC’s Agency on Bay Management (ABM) 
(TB1b) 
1985 Ongoing Self-initiated: 
Constraints 
 
Slow 
Decline 
Med. – High 
Tampa Bay National Estuary Program (TBNEP) 
(TB3a) 
1990 1998 External: 
Incentive 
 
Re-Creation: 
TBEP, NMC 
High 
Tampa Bay Nitrogen Management Consortium 
(NMC) (TB4) 
1996 Ongoing Self-initiated: 
Constraints 
 
Stable High 
Tampa Bay Estuary Program (TBEP) (TB3b) 1998 2015 Self-initiated: 
Constraints 
 
Reorientation High 
Tampa Bay Estuary Program (TBEP) (TB3c)) 2015 Ongoing Self-initiated: 
Constraints 
Stable High 
Tillamook Bay Watershed      
USDA Rural Clear Water Project (Till1) 1981 1996 External-
Incentive 
 
Work 
Complete 
Healthy & 
Useful 
Bay Sanitation Technical Advisory Committee 
(BSTAC) (Till2) 
1987 1993 External: 
Mandate 
 
Untimely 
Death 
Healthy & 
Useful 
Tillamook Bay National Estuary Program 
(TBNEP) (Till3a) 
1993 1999 External: 
Incentive 
 
Recreation: 
TCCP 
Low – Med. 
(Perspective) 
Tillamook County Performance Partnership 
(TCPP) (Till3b) 
1999 2002 Self-initiated: 
Constraints 
 
Recreation: 
TEP 
Low 
Tillamook Estuaries Partnership (TEP) (Till3c) 2002 2004 Self-initiated: 
Constraints 
 
Reorientation Low – Med. 
(Perspective) 
Tillamook Estuaries Partnership (TEP) (Till3d) 2004 Ongoing Self-initiated: 
Constraints 
 
Slow 
Decline 
Low – Med. 
(Perspective) 
 
 
 
 
 
frequency in the Narragansett Bay watershed (Imperial, et al. 2017).  However, the analysis does 
include regional collaborations when the watershed was itself nested within that larger 
geographic area.  Table 3 lists each of the partnerships, its developmental trajectory, and 
judgements about its overall health and usefulness based on available data.  The analysis then 
examined the rule structures governing collaborative processes as well as the factors contributing 
to reorientations and recreations to better understand the convergence process.  Given that some 
of the collaborative governance efforts date back many decades, the analysis focuses primarily 
on those changes that   
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Table 4: Typology of Change Initiation Process 
 
Self-Initiated Externally Initiated 
 
No Constraints on Rule Development 
 Environmental Study of Rehoboth, Indian River and 
Assawoman Bay (IB1) 
 Inland Bays Study Group (IBSG) (IB3) 
 Decisions for Delaware: Sea Grant Looks at the Inland 
Bays (IB4) 
 Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council (TBRPC) (TB1a) 
 
 
Mandate: Legislation, Executive Order, or other 
directive compels specifies one or more rules 
 Coastal Sussex Water Quality Program (CWA Section 
208) (IB2) 
 Governor’s Task Force on the Inland Bays (GTFIB) 
(IB5a) 
 Inland Bays Monitoring Committee (IBMC) (IB5b) 
 New England Interstate Water Pollution Control 
Commission (NB1) 
 New England River Basins Commission (NB2) 
 RI Areawide Water Quality Management Plan Section 
208 Comprehensive Plan (NB3) 
 Tampa Bay Study Commission (TB2) 
 Bay Sanitation Technical Advisory Committee 
(BSTAC) (Till2) 
 
 
Constraints: Grant conditions or due to 
institutionalization process creates higher order rules 
 Center for the Inland Bays (CIB) (IB6b, c, d) 
 Narragansett Bay Project (NBP) (NB4b) 
 Narragansett Bay Estuary Program (NBEP) (NB4c) 
 TRBPC’s Agency on Bay Management (ABM) (TB1b) 
 Tampa Bay Nitrogen Management Consortium (NMC) 
(TB4) 
 Tampa Bay Estuary Program (TBEP) (TB3b, c) 
 Tillamook County Performance Partnership (TCPP) 
(Till3b) 
 Tillamook Estuaries Partnership (TEP) (Till3c, d) 
 
 
Incentives: voluntary participation but grant conditions 
may specify rules 
 Delaware Inland Bays Estuary Program (DIBEP) (IB6a) 
 Narragansett Bay Project (NBP) (NB4a) 
 Narragansett Bay Estuary Program (NBEP) (NB4d) 
 Tampa Bay National Estuary Program (TBNEP) (TB3a) 
 USDA Rural Clear Water Project (Till1) 
 Tillamook Bay National Estuary Program (TBNEP) 
(Till3a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
occurring from the late 1990s onward because there is better archival data and interview data 
available to help analyze these rule configurations.  These data were then used to explore the 
study’s four research question. 
 
Internal vs. External Activation & Change 
 
A core question related to the activation of collaborative governance processes is the 
extent to which they are self-initiated.  The literature provides a variety of reasons that 
collaborative governance networks are established (Imperial, et al. 2018).  Government agencies, 
funders, or other ‘top-down’ forces encourage or require network participation or specify other 
aspects of governance processes.  Networks can also self-organize to address a common 
problem, provide a service, or accomplish a task (Huxham and Vangen 2000; Huxham 2003).  
Some are designed deliberately reflecting the intentionality resulting from the shared goals of 
founding members (Katz and Gartner 1988).  Others are emergent and take shape as network 
participants grapple with different challenges (Head 2008).  While similar forces presumably 
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drive change processes associated with reorientations and recreations, it is unclear to what extent 
these processes are self-initiated.   
 
Each episode of collaborative governance and its corresponding set of reorientations and 
recreations was examined, and four different types of initiations emerged as summarized in 
Table 4.  Roughly an even number of self-initiated (16) and externally initiated changes were 
observed.  While 4 self-initiated changes were observed that had no constraints on rule 
development, it was much more common to observe self-initiated changes that were subject to 
constraints (12). These constraints emerged from two sources.  Many of these consisted or 
reorientations or recreations that were subject to rules that were institutionalized in some higher 
order set of rules (e.g., binding agreement, legislation, etc.).  The collaborations also may also 
receive grant funds that impose some obligations in terms of duties or tasks but in no way 
stimulated the changes in rules.  Other initiations and changes were driven externally by some 
sort of mandate (e.g., legislation, executive order) (8) or resulted from incentives designed to 
induce voluntary participation in a program (e.g., federal grant) (6).  Examples of each set of 
changes are described below.   
 
Self-Initiated Change Processes 
 
Four collaborative governance efforts were self-initiated, and participants had no 
constraints beyond those that were self-imposed.  These include the development of the 
Environmental Study of Rehoboth, Indian River and Assawoman Bay (1969) (Inland Bays); 
Inland Bays Study Group (IBSG), Decisions for Delaware: Sea Grant Looks at the Inland Bays 
(i.e., DE Sea Grant Report), and the Tampa Bay Regional Planning Commission (TBRPC).  It 
was more common to observe self-initiated efforts that were subject to some minor constraints 
that were established by some higher-order set of rules.  It was more common to find 
reorientations and recreations that were self-initiated but subject to some minor reporting and 
oversight constraints because of taking EPA funds.  There were also many examples where the 
collaborative process institutionalized parts of its social architecture in a way that constrained 
how future self-initiated changes could occur.  In essence, the members established a set of 
constitutional level rules to ensure stability.   
 
For example, while each watershed had the flexibility to form a collaborative governance 
structure to implement the plan produced pursuant to the NEP, the acceptance of federal funds 
does subject the partnership to some minor.  When the TBRPC formed the Agency for Bay 
Management (ABM), it provided it with a great deal of autonomy, but it remains subject to its 
oversight.  Thus, while these partnerships were self-initiated, they are subject to higher-order 
rules that impose a limited set of constraints, duties, or obligations.  The way a collaborative 
process is institutionalized can impose some constraints.  For example, the Center for the Inland 
Bays (CIB) is a nonprofit organization chartered with state legislation, which limits the speed at 
which some changes can occur. The interlocal agreement that forms the Tampa Bay Estuary 
Program (TBEP) effectively operates as contract binding the parties.  While it can be changed, 
this is subject to negotiation.  The Tillamook Estuaries Partnership (TEP) is chartered as a 
Section 501 (c)3 tax exempt organization, which imposes some legal constraints in terms of what 
it can and cannot do.  The Tampa Bay Nitrogen Management Consortium was also self-initiated, 
but it is nested within and operates subject to the TBEP’s nitrogen reduction goals.  
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Externally Driven Change Processes 
 
The second set of change processes were externally driven due to mandates or incentives.  
The use of the external mandate strategy was relatively common during the 1960s, 1970s, and 
1980s but largely gave way to an external incentive driven strategy in the 1990s and beyond.  
This pattern is consistent with the shift in the phases of intergovernmental relations (IGR) first 
observed by Wright (1988).  The case data identified mandates from legislative and regulatory 
requirements (e.g., Section 208), a directive in the form of an executive order by a Governor or 
the President, or a resolution by county commissioners.  For example, collaborations in the 
Inland Bays and Narragansett Bay prepared a Section 208 plan to comply with requirements in 
the 1972 Clean Water Act.  Delaware’s Governor used an executive order to establish the 
Governor’s Task Force on the Inland Bays (GTFIB).  Similarly, once it produced its report, the 
governor used another mandate to replace the GTFIB with the Inland Bays Monitoring 
Committee (IBMC).  A Presidential Executive Order initiated the New England River Basin 
Commission, Mandates can also occur at the local level as evidenced by the Tillamook County 
resolution that formed the Bay Sanitation Technical Advisory Committee (BSTAC). Another 
interesting example is the use of a federal-state compact to structure the New England Interstate 
Water Pollution Control Commission (NEIWPCC).  Joining the compact required voluntary 
participation by the states, however, the commission itself is subject to the Compact’s 
requirements.  In each case, the mandates specify some core rules that provide structure to the 
collaborative process. 
 
The most prominent example of the external incentive strategy across the four cases was 
the participation in the NEP.  The decision to participate was voluntary.  However, a condition of 
participation was accepting several fundamental rules that influenced the development of the 
social architecture.  Each watershed was required to use a committee structure called a 
management conference.  Members were required to make decisions based on consensus, and its 
purpose was defined in that it had to ultimately produce a comprehensive conservation and 
management plan (CCMP).  In return, state and local officials received money to support the 
collaborative processes with some hope that implementation funds would continue supporting 
their efforts.  However, the configuration or other rules such as the selection of the problems, 
specification of members and their roles on committees, and level of access that stakeholders had 
to decision making resulted in quite different structures for the four collaborative processes.   
 
The external-incentive strategy was also used to initiate change in at least one instance.  
While the EPA maintained a relatively “hands off” approach during the implementation process, 
there was one instance where the external-incentive approach was used to encourage the 
initiation of reorientation of the Narragansett Bay Estuary Program (NBEP) because its members 
feared that EPA would terminate its funding.   
 
Death of Collaborative Processes 
 
The cases shed some light on the different ways that collaborative processes can die.  
Some simply complete their work (e.g., Tampa Bay Study Commission, Sea Grant’s report on 
the Inland Bays) before ever getting to the institutionalization stage.  Some take much longer to 
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complete their work like the Rural Clean Water Program (RCWP) in Tillamook Bay.  Some die a 
relatively rapid death like the Section 208 planning processes in the Inland Bays and 
Narragansett Bay.  While the processes themselves had value, particularly in Rhode Island, 
implementation funding was lacking and effectively terminated by EPA in 1981.  While both 
processes could have continued, the withdrawal of federal support led to a quick decision to end 
the efforts in both watersheds.  There were also several examples of untimely death.  The Inland 
Bays Study Group (IBSG) was effectively replaced by the GTFIB.  The Inland Bays Monitoring 
Committee (IBMC) was effectively replaced by the Delaware Inland Bays Estuary Program 
(DIBEP).  President Reagan’s executive order abolishing the river basin commissions across the 
country effectively ended the New England River Basin Commission (NERBC), even though it 
was largely regarded as the most effective in the country (Imperial, et al. 2017). The creation of 
the Tillamook Bay National Estuary Program (TBNEP) led to the disbandment of the Bay 
Sanitation Technical Advisory Committee (BSTAC).  Clearly, the death of collaborative 
processes can also be self-initiated or occur as the result of externally driving forces.   
 
Social Architecture - the Invisible Hand of Network Governance 
 
The analysis next focused on identifying the social architecture of the watershed 
partnerships. Researchers have utilized a variety of approaches to examine and compare the 
structure of partnerships formed to enhance network governance (Chaffin, et al. 2015, 2012; 
Margerum & Johnston 2015; Hardy 2010; Hardy & Koontz 2009; Koehler & Koontz 2008; 
Margerum 2008; Bidwell & Ryan 2006; Clark, et al. 2005; Dakins, et al. 2005; Moore & Koontz 
2003).  Several interesting typologies have advanced our understanding of the dynamics of these 
partnerships (e.g., Diaz-Kope & Miller-Stevens 2015; Margerum 2008; Moore & Koontz 2003).  
There is also a growing body of collaboration and network governance literature that views 
network structure as the product of a configuration or rules, norms, routines, and shared culture 
(e.g., Sandstrom et al. 2015; Powell 1990; Kickert et al. 1997; Keast et al. 2004; Mandell & 
Keast 2008; Huxham & Vangen 2000; Vangen & Huxam 2003; Mandell & Steelman 2003; Saz-
Carranza & Ospina 2010; Lynn et al. 2000; Milward & Provan 2000).   
 
Researchers have used rules to describe how members make decisions and how 
collaborative processes occur (Mandell & Keast 2007, 583). Rules specify who gets to shape the 
network agenda, who has power to act on the network members’ behalf, and what resources 
should be deployed to advance the network’s agenda (Huxham & Vangen 2000, 1166; Vangen & 
Huxam 2003, S67).  Rules also specify membership patterns (e.g., Margerum & Johnston 2015; 
Hardy 2010; Hardy & Koontz 2009; Margerum 2008; Bidwell & Ryan 2006; Moore & Koontz 
2003).  Rules can even describe how collaborative activities operate at different levels within a 
collaborative process (Imperial 2005a).  Mandell and Steelman (2003) go further to identify three 
broad categories or rules.  Orientation of members refers to the problem orientation of members 
and their commitment to shared goals.  Intensity of linkages and breadth of effort refer to how 
members are organized.  Complexity of purpose and scope of the effort specify what is hoped to 
be accomplished (Mandell & Steelman 2003, 205; Mandell & Keast 2008, 721).  Researchers 
also argue that the configuration of rules can either create a favorable environment for productive 
interaction or becomes a barrier to the process (Mandell & Steelman 2003, 217).   
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The cross-case analysis supports that argument that the configuration of rules and norms 
gives rise to the “hidden structure” that produces spontaneous order within the network’s social 
system (Hayek 1945).  It is analogous to the flocking behavior of birds.  Only a few simple rules 
of self-organization (e.g., separation rules to avoid crowding neighbors, alignment rules that steer 
towards average heading of neighbors, and, cohesion rules that steer towards average position of 
neighbors) in combination produce coordinated action that allows the birds move in seeming 
unison to undertake strategic behavior without any discernable leader (Imperial, et al. 2016b).  
Similarly, collaborative governance processes craft rules that provide for coordinated action that 
advances a strategic purpose without the necessity of a hierarchical organization or “leader” with 
the authority to compel others to act in a specified way.  Indeed, relatively small modifications to 
rule configuration can give rise to very different structures and processes.   
 
Describing the Social Architecture of Collaborative Governance  
 
This study relies on an approach to institutional analysis developed by Elinor Ostrom 
(2005, 1999, 1990) and her colleagues (e.g., Imperial 2005a, 1999a, 1999b; Imperial & Yandle 
2005; Kauneckis & Imperial 2007; Imperial & Kauneckis 2003; Imperial & Hennessey 2000; 
Blomquist 1992) to identify a set of rules that give rise to the social architecture.  Rules are 
implicit or explicit attempts to achieve order and predictability among humans (Ostrom, 2005, 
1999, 1986).  Rules forbid, permit, or require some action or outcome and the sanctions 
authorized when rules are not followed (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995, 584).  Rules can be formal 
(e.g., laws, policies, regulations, etc.) or informal (e.g., shared understandings and social norms) 
(Ostrom 2005, 1990).  Informal rules are sometimes referred to as “rules-in-use” because they 
are the rules that individuals refer to when asked to explain and justify their interactions with 
fellow participants (Ostrom et al., 1994, 39).  Rules operate at different levels for different actors 
(e.g., constitutional, collective choice, operational).  Rules can be nested in another set of rules 
that define how the first set of rules can be changed (Kiser & Ostrom, 1982).  Therefore, rules 
operate configurationally.  The way one set of rules functions depends upon the way it interacts 
with other rules.  Thus, minor differences in the configuration of rules can produce very different 
governance structures. 
 
It was clear from this analysis that some rules were crafted deliberately after debate 
among network members.  For example, In Tampa Bay there was considerable discussion and 
consequently a decision to exclude the regional planning agency as a member of the policy 
committee and later as a member of the collaborative organization formed by the interlocal 
agreement.  In other instances, important rule choices resulted from an emergent process due to 
group interactions with little consideration of the possible consequences of rule choices.  For 
example, respondents could often tell you how they made decisions but did not recall ever 
formally deciding upon the rule.  Similarly, in some instances very little deliberation went into 
deciding which organizations or members of the public would participate or what the role or 
purpose of a committee was going to be.  In other cases, these decisions were subject to clear 
deliberation and discussion. 
 
The cross-case analysis identified examples of three interrelated sets of rules: boundary 
rules (member and strategy), decision rules (preference aggregation, distribution of power, 
distribution of roles or responsibilities, and, distribution of participation), and coordination rules  
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Figure 2: Social Architecture of Network Governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(exchange, monitoring, dispute resolution, and enforcement) first proposed by Imperial & 
Koontz (2007) [Figure 2].  Given the limits of earlier archival records, most of the analysis 
focused on the collaborative governance efforts from the 1990s forward.  The rules varied in 
their formality and in most instances, the social architecture consisted of both formal and 
informal rules.  As noted earlier, some rules were imposed on the collaborative process because 
of a mandate or as a condition of receiving funding. But even in these situations, other rules were 
the result of self-organizing processes.   
 
Boundary Rules 
 
Boundary rules distinguish a network from other organizations within the 
interorganizational system.  They reflect important choices concerning the partnership’s 
fundamental purposes and the problems it addresses.  Two interrelated sets of boundary defining 
rules are of importance – member rules and strategy rules (Imperial & Koontz, 2007).  The 
combination of problems and purposes helps identify the membership needed to address them.  
At the same time, collaborations are limited in terms of what they can do by their resources, 
authorities, and competing interests and values.  Accordingly, membership composition 
influences and constrains the selection of strategy rules (Bonnell & Koontz, 2007; Koontz et al., 
2004; Imperial & Kauneckis, 2003; Koontz, 2003).  These cases suggest that healthy and useful 
collaborative processes tend to have well integrated member and strategy rules.  Conversely, 
when these rules are not properly aligned it can limit their health and usefulness and even 
generate conflict.  
Life-Cycles and Developmental Processes in Watershed Partnerships 
 
- 16 - 
Member rules specify who can or cannot be a member.  Attracting, embracing, and 
supporting the ‘right’ kind of members and determining when they should enter (or exit) network 
processes is a challenge that never dissipates (Agranoff and McGuire 2001, 1999; Johnston et al. 
2010, 703; Vangen and Huxam 2003; Saz- Carranza and Ospina 2010; O’Leary et al. 2012).  The 
reorientations and recreations noted in subsequent sections often involve changes in membership.  
Similarly, some collaborative processes changed their membership as they evolve.  For example, 
the high-level policy committee in the Inland Bays initially left out the Secretary of the 
Department of Agriculture.  In Narragansett Bay, the directors of the Division of Planning 
(RIDOP) and the Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) were similarly excluded 
from membership.  In both instances, these members were subsequently added to the policy 
committee during in the collectivity stage when it was clear the purposes of the collaboration 
necessitated their involvement in this high-level decision-making committee because their 
exclusion was hindering the health of the collaborative processes.   
 
The analysis identified several different types of membership rules.  There were clearly 
different “types” of membership (e.g., voting vs. nonvoting) (Imperial & Koontz, 2007).  In fact, 
it was quite common to find the inclusion of ex-officio members in many of the collaboration.  
More interesting was the wide range of differences in terms of the membership size and the level 
of inclusiveness.  For example, the high-level policy committee for the Tampa Bay National 
Estuary Program (TBNEP) consisted of 6 local governments and 3 regulatory agencies.  The 
other 26 local governments in the watershed were left out of the governing arrangement.  
Similarly, the high-level policy committee for the Inland Bays initially consisted of only 4 
members (1 local government and 3 regulatory agencies).  By way of contrast, Tampa the 
Agency on Bay Management (ABM) for Tampa Bay had over 65 members and the governing 
arrangement for the Tillamook County Performance Partnership (TCPP) was open and targeted 
at around 61 members.  Even the TCPP’s executive board specified 10-12 possible members.   
 
While organizations typically comprise the membership, there can be provisions for 
citizens or interest group representatives (Moore & Koontz, 2003).  All the NEPs had some sort 
of advisory committee structure that included a management committee consisting of various 
stakeholders like agency managers and interest group representatives.  Others included 
stakeholders and citizens in some variation of Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC) and technical 
experts in some sort of technical advisory committee (TAC).  In some cases, the committees 
were quite active and played a vital role in the process.  For example, the CAC helped shape the 
recommendations that ended up in the CCMP in Tillamook Bay.  In Narragansett Bay, the 
committees lacked purpose and had poorly defined roles and purposes and were ultimately 
disbanded.  It was also common to find that the chair of the CAC or TAC served as a member of 
the management committee to ensure that those interests were represented.  
 
Membership in collaborative process can be voluntary or mandated by some higher-order 
set of rules (e.g., statute, articles of incorporation, charter, etc.).  For example, the county 
resolution that adopted the TCPP specified which organizations would be represented on the 
executive board while membership on the larger TCPP was left relatively open.  The original 
legislation that established the CIB specifies not only the members but left the designation of two 
citizen members to the Speaker of the House and President Pro tempore of the Senate.  Initially, 
they were nonvoting members but at the request of the board the legislature made them voting 
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members the following year.  Today, the board elects up to 4 citizen members.  In the Tillamook 
Bay, the management committee selected the members of the CAC, Science and Technical 
Advisory Committee (STAC), and Financial Strategy Committee (FTC).  Conversely, in Tampa 
Bay they left membership in their Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) open with 200+ 
members but appointed a CAC with around 30 members.  As the organization evolves, it 
typically creates rules pertaining to the addition of new members. For example, the interlocal 
agreement establishes a process whereby new parties can join the partnerships.  Similarly, rules 
may be crafted to specify how a member is expelled.  For example, while the TCPP allowed a 
member to be expelled for missing three successive meetings but had no rules governing who 
could join.   
 
Strategy rules specify the underlying purposes of the collaborative governance network.  
In other words, what it will do, how will it do it, and where will it get the necessary resources for 
organizational activities (e.g., clients, products, goods, services, etc.) (Imperial & Koontz, 2007).  
They identify the problem (or set of problems) that are the partnership’s domain.  Sometimes, the 
purposes are clearly established early in the process.  For example, the Governor’s executive 
order establishing the GTFIB and the legislation establishing the CIB set forth the goals of both 
collaborations.  In other cases, the purposes reveal themselves as the collaborative process 
unfolds.  For example, the basic purpose of each NEP was clear – produce a CCMP.  However, 
identifying the focal problems that would become the catalyst for action often occurred later in 
the process during the collectivity stage, which sometimes required changes to membership 
rules.  For example, EPA pushed the Inland Bays to focus mostly on water quality and many of 
the land use and agricultural issues were ignored but were added later in the process, which 
necessitated brining in new stakeholders to the process.  A major flooding event during the 
planning process in Tillamook Bay led to the inclusion of a new purpose during the plan’s 
creation.  However, since EPA was funding the planning effort members were limited to only 
addressing the water quality impacts of flooding.  In Tampa Bay, while the CCMP focuses on a 
wide range of problems, nutrient loadings and habitat restoration emerged as the core purposes 
that continue to drive collaborative processes to this day.  Conversely, other than producing a 
CCMP, members of the collaborative process in Narragansett Bay have been unable to identify 
that core purpose or strategy to drive its collaborative processes.   
 
The strategy also includes rules specifying legitimate responses to problems that are 
within (or outside) of the collaborative governance network’s domain.  Responses noted in the 
literature include serving as a convener, catalyst for action, information provider, advocacy, 
organizer, funder, technical assistance provider, capacity builder, partner, dispute resolver, 
facilitator, or it may even develop and implement projects and programs (Imperial, 2005a; 
Himmelman, 1996).  There were clear examples of many of these roles.  The IBSG focused 
primarily on research and information sharing while the Tampa Bay Study Commission (TBSC) 
focused on producing a report designed to provide information and advocate for actions needed 
to address its water quality problems.  The NEIWPCC shares information, provides technical 
assistances, tries to build capacity, and serves as a convener.  The CIB and Tillamook Estuary 
Partnership (TEP) primarily conduct research, share information, educate the public, and 
implement restoration projects.  Conversely, the TBEP and the Tampa Bay Nitrogen 
Management Consortium focus on coordinating and facilitating individual and joint actions 
needed to achieve the nutrient reduction and habitat restoration goals contained in the CCMP.  
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The ABM though comments on projects and provides an advocacy function but does not 
implement projects.  Rules may also specify what roles are illegitimate.  For example, the CIB 
and TEP educate and provide information but lobbying and advocacy activities are somewhat 
restricted given their legal status as nonprofit organizations.  The TBEP interlocal agreement and 
the by-laws for the CIB and TEP also specify and limit their purposes.   
 
Strategy rules also reflect choices that govern the way members work together to address 
watershed problems.  Examples include members deciding how to work together to share 
information, facilities, staff, programming, or other resources.  It can also involve developing 
shared goals or performance targets, making shared decisions, entering contractual relationships, 
and sharing power.  These “tools” can be combined in different ways to allow network members 
to work together to produce some sort of value that they are unable to produce individually 
(Prentice, et al. 2019).  There were many examples of these operational and policy-level 
activities in the four watersheds that are documented elsewhere (Imperial 2005a; Imperial 2005b; 
Imperial & Hennessey 2000).   
 
Finally, the strategy by default includes the geographic boundaries spanned by the 
collaborative governance process.  For the four cases, it mostly consisted of the watershed 
boundaries and they did not change appreciably across the collaborative governance efforts that 
occurred in each watershed with a few exceptions.  However, when the TCPP was disbanded and 
replaced by the Tillamook Estuaries Partnership (TEP) it expanded the boundary to include all 
the estuary watersheds within the county’s jurisdiction.  Conversely, while the Narragansett Bay 
watershed drains a considerable area of Massachusetts, those state interests had only minimal 
involvement.  Conversely, rather than doing a Section 208 plan for the Narragansett Bay 
watershed, state officials decided to do a state-wide plan that would cover all watershed areas.  
Accordingly, the geographic scope of the collaborative process is an important strategy rule.   
 
Decision Rules 
 
Decision rules shape the processes by which members make decisions (Imperial & 
Koontz, 2007).  Interactive processes are not self-executing so important choices are made about 
how to make decisions.  Preference aggregation rules specify how members make decisions.  
During the initial stages of a partnership, decision rules are likely to be informal with a reliance 
on consensus decision making or simple majority voting rules.  Over time, decision rules may 
grow in complexity, specificity, and formality to reduce transaction costs by making decision 
making more reliable and reproducible (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2005, 426).  The collaborations 
relied on “consensus” decision making in the preparation of their CCMPs because it was a 
requirement associated with participation in the NEP.  However, its use varied considerably 
across the cases.  The Inland Bays and Tillamook Bay defined consensus as meaning near 
unanimity and worked hard to ensure that those who would be most affected agreed.  Tampa Bay 
took votes, though not to push through anything controversial it was more of a way of gauging 
progress or reaching closure on an issue.  Instead, the tried to reach consensus and make sure 
those most affected agreed.  Accordingly, they also strived for unanimity.  The consensus rule in 
Narragansett Bay was unclear and applied inconsistently during the process.  They clearly did 
not strive for unanimity and often reached closure on controversial issues even though those 
most affected disagreed with the outcome.   
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It was also common for some decisions to require greater agreement among members 
than others.  For example, a change to the by-laws, adoption of the budget, or expelling a 
member might require a super majority while other decisions needing a simple majority.  For 
example, collaborative arrangements like the TBEP, TEP, and CIB use majority voting although 
there may be different rules in some situations such as modifying the by-laws or adding new 
members.  The TCPP’s executive board utilized majority voting while the committee relied on 
consensus, however, a 2/3 majority of both was needed to amend the by-laws.   
 
As the organizational structure becomes specialized and differentiated there is often 
increased complexity in the configuration of decision rules.  There may be a distribution of 
power within the organizational arrangement by establishing voting or nonvoting members or by 
creating a governing board or executive committee as noted in the TCPP example.  There may 
also be a distribution of roles or responsibilities among members (e.g., establishing officers, sub-
committee membership, etc.).  As sub-units are created (e.g., a work group or sub-committees), 
rules will be crafted to determine the membership and strategy of the sub-unit and specify their 
decision rules and relationship to the larger organization.   
 
All the NEP’s maintained formal subcommittees as do the CIB, TBEP, and TEP.  While 
the high-level policy or executive committee was the ultimate decisionmaker and hiring entity 
for support staff, many relied on a management committee that met much more frequently to do 
most of the work.  There was also a lot of variation in terms of the roles and responsibilities of 
the subcommittees.  Some were quite active and had a clear role or responsibility in the process.  
For example, Tillamook Bay’s CAC played an instrumental role in identifying the 
recommendations that were ultimately contained in the CCMP.  Conversely, the sub-committees 
in Narragansett Bay struggled with a lack of purpose, met infrequently, and were ultimately 
folded into its Management Committee.  Within a committee, roles might be established as well.  
For example, the committee chair often ran the meetings and the chair of the CAC and TAC 
often had the right to represent their committees’ interests on the management committee.  
Establishing officers was also common for the collaborative organizations.  The TEP elects a 
president, vice-president, and secretary/treasurer while the CIB elects a chair, vice-chair, and 
treasurer.  The TBEP, TEP, and CIB all rely on some combination of standing and ad hoc 
advisory committees as well.   
 
There may also be a distribution of participation in organizational decision making in 
terms of any member’s opportunity to participate in a decision (i.e., width) or their ability to 
determine the outcome (i.e., depth).  The results support the finding that the level of participation 
afforded to any member can vary considerably from informing, consulting, advising, co-
producing, to co-deciding (Edelenbos & Klijn 2005, 428 - 429).  In other words, all members are 
not created equal.  For example, members of advisory committees in the NEPs or the TBEP, 
TEP, or CIB varied considerably in terms of the ability to participate and influence decision 
making due to the frequency of meetings and their role in the process.  For example, the CAC in 
Tillamook Bay played a vital role and really shaped the contents of the CCMP’s 
recommendations.  In Narragansett Bay, while the public had little direct access to the process, 
its 45-member management committee included a wide range of stakeholders and agency 
representatives and it was not uncommon for staff to work with the stakeholders to try and 
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overrule agencies in their attempt to influence change.  Similarly, when first created, members of 
the CIB’s CAC complained that they had no role or ability to influence decision making.   
 
Coordination Rules 
 
As the organization evolves, preference aggregation rules may give rise to an additional 
set of coordination rules (Imperial & Koontz, 2007; Sobrero & Schrader, 1998, 586 - 587).  
Membership often requires some rights, duties, responsibilities, or obligations beyond merely 
attending an occasional meeting such as sharing information, contributing organizational 
resources (e.g., money, equipment, staff, etc.), or making changes to their organizational 
policies, procedures, or priorities.  Exchange rules specify each member’s rights, duties, 
expectations, or obligations.  They also delineate the expectations and benefits that accrue due to 
membership.  For example, are you a voting or non-voting member or will the activities of the 
collaboration advance your organization’s goals.  In Tampa Bay, considerable effort went into 
negotiating the interlocal agreement that formed the Tampa Bay Estuary Program (TBEP).  In 
addition to specifying membership and decision rules, the agreement also contains clear duties 
and expectations including annual dues that are used to sustain the collaborative organization.  
Negotiating the agreement took time and required the use of a facilitator. In the end, the 
investment was worth it because it ensured the benefits and costs of membership were properly 
aligned.  Conversely, when Narragansett Bay decided to adopt its CCMP as an element of the 
State Guide Plan, that decision carried with it a set of duties and obligations for all state 
agencies.  However, the Division of Planning lacked membership on the high-level policy 
committee and had little control over the contents of the final plan it was expected to adopt.  
Similarly, the NBP’s management committee used a somewhat dysfunctional “consensus” 
process that included items in the plan over the objections of affected agencies who disagreed 
with the proposed obligations the plan would impose.   
 
In any collaborative process, member(s) may fail to follow through on their commitments 
by not attending meetings, neglecting to exchange agreed upon resources (time, money, 
information), or acting in a manner counter to established rules.  Thus, monitoring rules may be 
created to foster accountability and help ensure that members follow through on commitments.  
Sometimes these rules are informal and rely on peer pressure (e.g., reporting meeting attendance 
records on minutes).  In other cases, it was accomplished through formal processes by requiring 
annual reports and work plans to be reviewed by various committees (Imperial 2005b).  Tampa 
Bay’s interlocal agreement goes a step further and requires a progress report on the progress 
towards the CCMP’s goals every two years.  In addition, as a condition of taking EPA funding, 
the CIB, NBEP, TBEP, and TEP are required to participate in a periodic evaluation process.   
 
While accountability and compliance with exchange rules often occurs due to social 
norms and peer pressure that develops through monitoring processes, enforcement rules may be 
used to sanction members for noncompliance (e.g., suspend voting privileges, fines, expulsion, 
etc.).  It is not uncommon for by-laws to specify some process for removal of members for 
noncompliance with rules.  For example, the Interlocal Agreement for Tampa Bay includes 
provisions that allow a member in “willful and significant noncompliance with the CCMP goals 
or the terms of the Agreement” to be removed by a unanimous vote of all remaining members.   
 
Life-Cycles and Developmental Processes in Watershed Partnerships 
 
- 21 - 
Conflicts occasionally occur among members due to events that occur inside or outside of 
the collaborative process.  As a result, it was not uncommon for dispute resolution rules to 
specify the process used to resolve differences.  This was primarily accomplished by using the 
social norm of trying to reach “consensus” even if the formal rules allow for or require simple 
majority voting (e.g., CIB, TCCP, and TBEP).  In some cases, collaborative processes used third 
party facilitators or neutral parties to reduce conflict or broker agreements when confronted with 
controversial decisions.  For example, when the conflict threatened to derail Narragansett Bay’s 
CCMP the policy committee appointed a new chair of the Management Committee who was well 
respected and had not been party to prior discussions to help facilitate and manage conflict.  
Tampa Bay also relied on facilitation services to help negotiate the interlocal agreement.  Both 
efforts were effective.  Respondents also noted that having support staff with effective 
facilitation skills helped minimize conflict. 
 
Convergence & Path Dependence 
 
The cross-case analysis also reveals the importance of the convergence process.  Whether 
it was the development of the four estuary programs or the formation of the NBEP, CIB, TBEP, 
or the TCCP/TEP, it took time to craft the configuration of rules.  However, as noted in Table 3, 
these periods of convergence were punctuated by periodic change processes (i.e., reorientations 
and recreations) (Imperial et al. 2016a).  What is converged upon is the unique configuration of 
boundary, decision, and coordination rules.  As the four watersheds illustrate, while all were 
subject to the same set of externally imposed constraints by EPA, small changes in the rule 
configurations produced profoundly different structures that led to processes that varied widely 
in terms of their health and usefulness.     
 
Whether implicit or explicit, members of the collaborative governance effort made 
choices about the content of the boundary, decision, and coordination rules that interact to create 
its structure and control its processes.  It was clear that these choices unfolded over time in 
somewhat of a trial and error process as participants struggled to get the rules right.  While initial 
choices were required to activate collaborative processes, much of the design work unfolded 
during the collectivity stage as members interacted and discovered what they could do and how 
they could work together in the future to produce value.  Interestingly, respondents in many of 
watersheds noted that the processes took longer than they wanted.  At the same time, most 
respondents noted that these interactions were necessary and unavoidable.   
 
What gives rise to the unique structure though, is the configuration of the rules and how 
they interact with one another.  For example, once the member rules are determined, that limits 
the set of broader purposes (i.e., strategy rules) that are acceptable.  Conversely, the selection of 
a specific purpose (i.e., strategy rules) may necessitate the inclusion (or exclusion) of members 
needed to achieve those ends. These choices interact with decision rules to structure the 
interactions among member giving some more influence over decisions than others while at the 
same time coordination rules help clarify the benefits and costs associated with the collaboration.   
 
One of the more interesting observations that emerged from the cross-case analysis is that 
it provides further empirical support for the argument that convergence has a path dependent 
quality (Sydow et al. 2009) that is depicted graphically in Figure 3.  The activation stage is  
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Figure 3: Convergence as a Path Dependent Process 
 
 
Source: Sydow, et al. (2009) 
 
 
 
 
characterized by a broad scope of design choices.  Much like an architect begins with a blank 
sheet of paper.  But once decisions about the purpose of a structure unfold (e.g., size, number of 
bedrooms and bathrooms, other living requirements) and external constraints are considered 
(e.g., lot size, zoning requirements, etc.) what is possible begins to take shape.  Similarly, the 
participants in a collaborative process must make some initial choices about who will be part of 
the network (member rules) and what their fundamental purposes will be (strategy rules).  Even 
in situations where rules are imposed externally (e.g., executive order, legislation, or through a 
program like the NEP), members largely have a blank slate in terms of selecting other critical 
aspects of boundary, decision, and coordination rules.  Accordingly, many possible structures 
(and outcomes) are possible during the early activation stage (Sydow et al. 2009, 691).  Each 
choice necessarily narrows other choices that can be considered during the collectivity stage as 
members interact and make explicit choices about additional rules while others emerge as the by-
product of social interactions and group decisions.  Similarly, as the architect discusses the needs 
with the client and their finances, what is possible begins to narrow and tradeoffs are made to 
maximize functionality, ensure structural integrity, and remain within the project budget.  
Members of collaborative processes sometimes make tradeoffs as well between what is desired 
and that which is possible, practical, or can be accomplished within the resources that are 
available.   
 
The design choices made during the activation and collectivity stages (Phase I and II in 
Figure 3) transform the network into a set of self-reinforcing processes.  As rules become 
institutionalized, they lock-in members to a prescribed set of behaviors and actions (Phase III in 
Figure 3).  While many possible structures and outcomes were possible during the early 
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developmental stage, that is no longer the case and participants are reluctant to change these 
rules.  As a result, members of the collaborative governance process become entrapped by the 
system’s social dynamics (Sydow et al. 2009, 691).  New entrants are forced to work within the 
prevailing social architecture and continue reinforcing these rules (Sydow et al. 2009, 692).  
Ironically, even though the watershed governance efforts were formed out of a desire to be 
“flexible” and “adaptive”, once they mature they experience the same structural inertia that 
makes traditional bureaucratic organizations resist change.  As a result, the social architecture 
can have high degree of persistence and stability that allows it to endure for a long time if they 
continue obtaining the resources necessary for survival.   
 
While stability and persistence allow healthy and useful processes to endure for a 
considerable time, path dependency can have adverse consequences.  Two examples illustrate 
this point.  Despite a recreation and two reorientations the Narragansett Bay Estuary Program 
(NBEP) experienced more than two decades of rapid decline in health and usefulness even 
though other network governance arrangements working at smaller geographic areas within the 
watershed and elsewhere in the state managed to flourish (Imperial, et al. 2017).  In each 
instance, the NBEP’s decline was triggered by poor design choices related to boundary rules 
such as the lack of a shared problem that motivated collective action and continued 
disagreements concerning how power or decision making is shared (Imperial, et al. 2017).  Even 
though the EPA concluded in several internal evaluations that the NBEP’s performance was 
unsatisfactory, the EPA and some network members were reluctant to reorient or recreate the 
network.  This decline lasted almost two decades with resources allocated to unhealthy network 
processes when they could have been utilized in a more productive manner.  Had EPA ceased 
funding the NBEP, it is highly likely it would cease to exist.   
 
Delaware Inland Bays provides another example of the potential downside of path-
dependency.  When the network transitioned from plan development to implementation, network 
members formed a nonprofit organization, the Center for the Inland Bays (CIB), which was 
institutionalized using state legislation.  While this served the purpose of creating an independent 
organization that could accept EPA implementation funding, less attention was given to whether 
the organization’s new purposes would be consistent with the expectations of stakeholders or 
prior efforts like the IBMC that had a successful track record.  However, as configured, the CIB 
is largely limited to noncontroversial topics like conducting research, information sharing, public 
education, installing best management practices, and habitat restoration projects.  While these 
efforts are useful and provide value, the CIB had little discernable impact on slowing coastal 
development or addressing nutrient loadings from poultry production, both of which were the 
drivers for the other collaborative governance efforts in the watershed.  During the early years of 
the CIB, this change in purpose was a source of much frustration to the grassroots citizens 
involved with the IBMC.  Moreover, since the CIB’s rules were established by the legislature, 
they are difficult to change, and no new network has formed to address watershed issues because 
the CIB occupies that institutional space.   
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Developmental Trajectories – Stability, Decline, & Change 
 
With an improved understanding of the convergence process, the analysis turned to 
examining the different developmental trajectories that occurred over the life-cycle of the 
collaborative process identified in Table 3.  Convergence can clearly produce a stable structure 
that is resistant to change that can endure for a considerable time if it continues getting the 
resources needed for survival.  It can also lead to a period of decline in usefulness or health over 
time.  In some cases, when the social architecture is poorly designed, this decline can be quite 
rapid.  There were also numerous examples of change – reorientations and recreations – that 
occurred in both healthy and unhealthy processes.  Finally, as noted earlier, collaborative 
processes end for various reasons such as completing their work, lose access to necessary 
resources, or they get replaced by some other collaborative process.  Accordingly, when viewed 
over time (e.g., decades rather than years) the governance system appears much more dynamic 
and ebbs and flows as collaborative governance efforts emerge and disappear, only to be 
replaced by other efforts.  However, the sequence of reorientations and recreations occurring in 
rather healthy network processes is often far messier than what is suggested in the idealized 
Figure 1.  Figure 4 provides a visual representation of the trajectories summarized in Table 3.  
The only trajectory without a clear example is a failed activation.   
 
Figure 4 identifies several examples where the convergence process produced a healthy 
and useful collaborative governance structure that remained quite stable for some time like the 
Tillamook Estuaries Partnership (TEP).  The Tampa Bay Estuary Program (TBEP) and Center 
for the Inland Bays (CIB) also underwent a relatively long period of stability, which was 
punctuated by a reorientation.  Similarly, all the NEPs had institutionalized a collaborative 
process that led to the development of their CCMPs only to have that stability punctuated by a 
recreation that led to the development of a different social architecture that largely involved the 
same core members and purposes with varying degrees of health and usefulness. 
 
The discussion of the boundary, decision, and coordination rules also helps to clarify the 
distinction between a reorientation and a recreation.  Reorientations involve relatively rapid and 
discontinuous changes in rules that alter the character of the network’s structure and processes in 
some tangible way.  In Figure 1 and 4, they are represented by a dashed line returning to the 
collectivity stage.  Observed changes were relatively minor such as introducing new members 
(e.g., CIB and TBEP) or refining goals this still change the way members work together and 
change group dynamics.  Reorientations can also occur response to dissatisfaction with the 
perceived return on investment in network processes, the emergence of new priorities, a shift in 
purposes, the loss of valued network members (or their resources), or excessive turnover that 
causes network members to question prevailing norms, values, or the network’s way of doing 
things.  It can also occur in response to mergers (or de-mergers), new start-ups, the disbanding of 
organizations in the network, or changes in capacity that allow organizations to join the 
collaboration (Huxham 2003, 412).  External mandates or incentives can also trigger a 
reorientation.  A reorientation may also transform network processes by altering communication 
patterns, decision processes, or established routines such that new processes emerge.   
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Figure 4: Developmental Trajectories for Each Collaborative Processes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There were many examples of reorientations, most of which involved fine-tuning the 
social architecture designed to improve the health or usefulness of the collaborative processes.  
For example, the year after the CIB was created, it asked the legislature to make the chair of the 
CAC a voting member.  More recently, it changed its membership again to include up to 4 
citizen members appointed by the Board, which changed its dynamics again.  After years of 
decline, the NBEP’s management committee adopted a corrective action plan that included 
hiring a new director and staff and moving its home to the NEIWPCC attempting to improve the 
health and usefulness of its collaborative processes and better implement its newly adopted 
CCMP.  In Tampa Bay, the reorientation of the TBRPC led to the establishment of the Agency 
on Bay Management (ABM) that altered how it addressed and commented on issues impacting 
Tampa Bay.  Similarly, the TBEP went through two recent reorientations when it adopted an 
updated interlocal agreement and modified their shared goals and commitments based on its 
updated CCMP.  It underwent a further reorientation the following year when Pasco County and 
the Manatee County Port Authority joined the partnership.  The Tillamook Estuaries Partnership 
(TEP) underwent a reorientation in 2004 when the county passed a resolution changing its status 
from a voting to an ex-officio member.  Accordingly, based on these data reorientations most 
frequently involved updating key goals and purposes or introduced new members to change 
network dynamics rather than altering decision or coordination rules.  To return to the 
architectural metaphor, these changes are more like renovating a room to improve functionality 
or add value to a house.  
 
Recreations are akin to building a major addition that changes the fundamental character 
of the house by changing the purposes of rooms and creating new uses for existing space.  These 
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data support the argument that they involve a much larger shift in the core values or purposes of 
the collaborative governance effort (Imperial, et. al. 2016a).  They also tend to use the strategy of 
deactivation to expel members or introduce new participants to change network dynamics 
(Mandell and Steelman 2003, 215).  The dashed line in Figure 1 and 4 indicates a return to the 
activation stage because the changes are larger in scope and take longer to achieve because 
members must negotiate and reach agreement on many rule changes that modify their social 
architecture.  Moreover, while some changes were also intended to rebrand (e.g., new name) or 
had major changes in boundary, decision, and coordination rules, significant core members, 
values, and purposes remain that motivated participation in the prior structure.   
 
Recreations occurred for two reasons in these data.  There was some shift in purpose, best 
exemplified by the fact that the social architecture needed to develop a plan needed to be 
reconfigured to better accommodate the purposes associated with implementing a plan.  For 
example, when the GTFIB completed its report on the Inland Bays, the governor signed a new 
executive order creating the IBMC.  While it had many of the same members, it was charged 
with a new purpose and given a new name that emphasized the change in mission.  The Center 
for the Inland Bays (CIB) and Tampa Bay Estuary Program also adopted new names that 
signified fundamental shifts in mission.  The CIB shifted more to research, information sharing, 
and demonstration projects exemplified by the use of the term “Center” in their new name. 
Interestingly, Tampa Bay dropped “National” from the name to emphasize that it was first and 
foremost a local government partnership.   
 
The other primary reason for a recreation was when the collaboration experienced a rapid 
decline in health and usefulness as indicated in Figure 4.  In other words, design choices failed, 
often quickly.  This was the case with the Tillamook County Performance Partnership (TCPP), 
which only lasted about 3 years.  It was recreated as the Tillamook Estuaries Partnership (TEP) 
and chartered as a nonprofit organization.  It expanded its geographic footprint to include all the 
estuary watershed areas within the jurisdiction of Tillamook County.  Accordingly, while the 
core purposes remained largely unchanged, the membership underwent a major transition and the 
county government was no longer providing a leadership role as it had in many of the prior 
collaborative governance efforts.  The same was true for the Narragansett Bay Project (NBP).  Its 
reorganization as a program within the state’s department of environmental management and 
creation of a much smaller implementation committee.  This arrangement suffered a rapid 
decline in usefulness and 2 years later was rebranded as the Narragansett Bay Estuary Program 
(NBEP) with a management and advisory committee.  However, the committees lacked clear 
purposes and consequently met infrequently, and the new collaborative effort declined rapidly in 
health and usefulness.   
 
These data illustrate that death indeed does occur for a myriad of reasons [Figure 4].  The 
NERBC suffered an untimely death when President Reagan’s executive order eliminated the 
program.  It was widely regarded as the most successful of the river basin commissions 
developed through this program (Imperial, et al. 2017).  The collaborative processes associated 
with the Section 208 plans for Narragansett Bay and the Inland Bays were completed but the lack 
of federal and state implementation hindered their success and eventually these efforts died once 
funding was eliminated by EPA in 1981.  Other collaborative efforts completed their work and 
subsequently were eliminated.  For example, the Tampa Bay Study Commission (TBSC) ended 
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when its final report was completed.  While many of its recommendations were not 
implemented, it did elevate attention to the problems in the bay and is largely attributed as 
leading to the TBRPC’s creation of the ABM.  Conversely, the impact of the Environmental 
Study completed for the Inland Bays in 1969 was limited primarily to drawing attention to some 
of the water quality problems in the watershed.  In Tillamook Bay, the Rural Clean Water Project 
lasted from 1981 until 1996 when the project ran its course and funding was eliminated.  
However, it was extremely effective in terms of installing BMPs on dairy farms throughout the 
watershed.  Tillamook County’s Bay Sanitation Technical Advisory Committee was eliminated 
with the establishment of the Tillamook Bay National Estuary Program (TBNEP).  It provided a 
useful coordination mechanism and many of its members provided the core of the TBNEP’s 
management committee.   
 
Sustaining a Healthy and Useful Life 
 
Less clear is the linkage between change processes and sustaining the health and useful 
life of collaborative processes.  Table 4 provides a relative judgement of the health and 
usefulness of each collaborative process. Judgements about the health and useful life were 
guided by the questions noted in Table 1 and informed by the analysis of archival records and 
interviews with program participants.  The concept of a healthy and useful life is used in place of 
more traditional terms like “success” or “performance” for several reasons (Imperial, et al. 
2016a).  There is no generally accepted way to evaluate the performance of collaborative 
process.  This is likely due to the many ways they generate value.  Moreover, they create value in 
different ways during different developmental stages (Voets et al 2008; Mandell and Keast 
2008).  Therefore, the type of nurturing needed to sustain healthy network processes during early 
developmental processes can be quite different from what is needed when mature networks 
experience declines as indicated in Table 5 (Genskow and Born 2006, 56).   
 
What is interesting is that there were some efforts that clearly were healthy and useful 
over their durations (e.g., the GTFIB, IBMC, NERBC, TBNEP, TBEP, RCWP).  There were 
others that never managed to get the rule configuration right and never managed to develop 
useful collaborative processes (e.g., NBP, NBEP, TCPP, and the Section 208 planning 
processes).  It also appears that relatively frequent changes (reorientations and recreations) was a 
warning sign.  Conversely, long periods of stability in social architecture appears to be a sign of 
healthy and useful collaborative process.  This directly contradicts the notion that collaborative 
approaches to addressing environmental problems like ecosystem management, watershed 
management, or river basin management are more “adaptive”. 
 
The analysis also highlights the difficulty of evaluating collaborative processes using 
traditional notions of success like effectiveness, outputs, or outcomes.  Examples from the Inland 
Bays and Tillamook Bay illustrate some of the challenges.  The DIBEP’s CCMP was nearly 
rejected by the EPA but also helped unify state officials to provide additional support for their 
plan.  Moreover, state officials fundamentally disagreed with EPA in terms of what their plan 
should consist of.  Management Committee members wanted something like prior documents 
such as those produced by the GTFIB and were quite happy and supportive of the final CCMP.  
Conversely, EPA wanted a big thick comprehensive plan that would represent the culmination of 
the planning process, but state officials prevailed, and EPA begrudgingly approved the Inland 
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Bays CCMP.  The development of the CIB and its efforts over the last 25 years illustrate another 
way perspective matters.  Arguably it served some useful purposes, however, these purposes fail 
to match the initial expectations of many stakeholders because the CIB does not address issues 
related to growth management and agricultural operations.  Accordingly, the determination of the 
usefulness of the DIBEP and CIB clearly depends on your perspective or normative values. 
Many stakeholders were disappointed with what they perceived to be a “watered down” CCMP 
and a CIB that avoided controversial issues.  At the same time, the strength of the competing 
interests related to land development and agricultural issues (e.g., poultry farms) suggest it was 
highly unlikely that any type of binding agreement like the one crafted for Tampa Bay could 
have been achieved.  What emerged instead was a pragmatic approach that allowed members to 
work together to produce something of value that addresses shared problems in the watershed.   
 
Tillamook Bay illustrates another way perspective and normative judgements matter.  Its 
CCMP emphasized a series of measurable targets to guide implementation efforts to ensure that 
they moved beyond “random acts of environmental kindness” and focused on making a 
measurable difference in watershed problems (Imperial 2005b).  With the failure of the TCPP 
and shift to the TEP, this focus and the corresponding targets were no longer the focal point of 
implementation efforts.  In a twist of irony, implementation currently consist of those same 
“random acts of environmental kindness” that members tried to avoid when developing the 
CCMP.  That said, the projects still provide important environmental benefits, even if they are 
unable to make a fundamental difference in the watershed’s problems.  While some may be 
disappointed and the original CCMP’s priority targets were not achieved, that perspective would 
ignore the reality that the TCPP failed in part because there was no dedicated source of funding 
that allowed local officials to make a sustain effort in solving problems using the targets it 
developed.  Instead, participants essentially crafted a plan “B” and took a more pragmatic route 
by developing an institution that could function given the resources and local context.  Thus, the 
CIB and TEP arguably have had relatively healthy and useful lives even if they fell short of the 
original expectations.   
 
While these data do not allow for precise estimates of the shape of the curves depicted in 
Figures 1 and 4, the results are relatively consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis that at some 
point, even stable and healthy collaborations will incur some modest decline in their usefulness 
while others may fall into a slow steady period of decline.  Decline was often reflected in 
reduced frequency of meetings, scope of activity, or their ambitions and purposes narrowing over 
time.  However, the trajectories may be better depicted as wavy rather than smooth because the 
scope of activity increased or decreased during these periods of relative stability or decline.  This 
wavy pattern of variation in health and usefulness was evident to some degree in all four 
watersheds but these variations were not associated with change processes.  Rather, they seem to 
correspond to changes in staff, differences in leadership, better or more secure funding, or 
improved ways of delivering services.  In other words, the waviness was likely the product of 
increase or decreases of other types of nurturing strategies noted in Table 5.  In other words, 
management matters in terms of the health and usefulness of collaborative processes.   
 
While additional research needs to be done to better test the hypothesis that collaborative 
governance is likely to experience some period of decline (Imperial, et al. 2016; Mandell and 
Keast 2008; Sydow 2004), these findings and prior research provide some explanation to support  
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Table 5: Ways to Sustain Healthy Network Governance Processes 
 
  
Stages of Network Development 
 
 Activation Collectivity Institutionalization 
Stability, Decline,  
or Re-orientation 
 
Key Features 
of Each Stage 
 
 Membership is a bit 
unstable 
 Focus is on figuring 
out what the network 
can do 
 Differentiate roles of 
the network from that 
of its members 
 
 High member 
cohesion develops 
 Network has a distinct 
identity 
 Focus of discussions 
shifts from what to do 
to how to do it 
 
 Stable membership, 
processes, and 
resources 
 Process is not 
dependent on 
individuals 
 Focus is on fine-tuning 
network processes 
 Stability and 
members resist 
proposals for change 
 Resource streams are 
relatively secure 
 Few founding 
members are still 
involved 
 
 
Stage-Specific 
Symptoms of 
Unhealthy  
Network 
Processes 
 
 Poor attendance at 
meetings 
 Members do not seem 
to do more than attend 
the meetings 
 Difficulty finding a 
focal problem to 
motivate participation 
 A lot of overlap with 
existing networks 
 
 Unstable membership 
and decision processes 
 Meetings are filled 
with conflict 
 Asymmetries of power 
within network 
processes 
 Members unwilling to 
invest much more than 
their time at meetings 
 Focus shifts to what to 
do before relationship 
building occurs 
 
 Departures of key 
individuals is viewed 
as a crisis 
 Unstable membership, 
processes, or resource 
streams 
 Network maintenance 
becomes a goal rather 
than getting things 
done 
 Entrenchment stifles 
network capacity to 
innovate or adapt 
 
 Departures of key 
individuals is viewed 
as a crisis 
 Resistance to change 
when change is needed 
 Members exit or stop 
committing resources 
 Mission drift 
 Excessive member 
turnover 
 A lot of social loafing 
and free-riding 
 New problems 
command members 
attention 
 
 
Stage-Specific 
Tactics Used 
to Nurture 
Network 
Processes 
 
 Focus on attracting the 
right members and 
their leaders 
 Give thought to what 
members to include 
and when to 
incorporate them into 
network processes 
 Be deliberative and 
plan the network’s 
development 
 Small group of 
collaborative leaders 
are needed to 
“champion” the 
network’s 
development 
 Allow network’s 
collaborative culture 
to develop organically; 
expect and protect the 
time it takes for this to 
occur 
 
 Facilitate and nurture 
member interactions 
 Create space for dialog 
 Take time needed to 
build relationships and 
a stable process 
 Ensure members 
participate as equals 
within network 
processes 
 Clear rules regarding 
membership and 
network processes 
 Leadership is 
distributed among 
many network 
members 
 Members share credit 
and avoid placing 
blame 
 
 Rules structuring 
network processes are 
clearly described (e.g., 
websites, documents, 
by-laws) 
 New members are 
quickly socialized to 
new rules 
 Develop new 
processes to 
streamline decision 
making 
 Leadership is 
distributed among 
many network 
members 
 Members share credit 
and avoid placing 
blame 
 
 Do not ignore signs of 
prolonged decline 
 Periodic efforts to 
focus or refocus on 
mission 
 Disband, re-orient, or 
re-create if a better use 
of network resources 
 Small group of 
collaborative leaders 
are needed to 
“champion” re-
orientations 
 Leaders able to seek 
external input to 
evaluate network 
effectiveness 
 Members share credit 
and avoid placing 
blame 
 
 
Source: Imperial, et al. 2016a 
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this hypothesis.  These results support the notion that network members experience “burnout” 
because of the energy and commitment they put into network roles (Huxham and Vangen 2000, 
1161).  Members and support staff also move jobs, get promotions, and retire that can disrupt 
processes.  Once stability is achieved, members often feel it is safe to “pass the baton” and let 
others represent their organization.  This pattern was observed across many of the collaborative 
governance efforts.  New members may soon begin to dominate network membership and their 
level of personal commitment and priorities may be quite different than the founding members.  
Mission drift may occur due to incremental shifts in the network’s programmatic focus as 
members chase scarce resources or funders change priorities (Auer et al. 2011).  While the CIB 
and TEP have arguably experienced this mission drift, drifting also provided resources needed 
for survival.  Other declines are due to group dynamics.  The challenge Narragansett Bay has had 
during the NBP and NBEP is that the group dynamics have always been dysfunctional, and this 
contributed to their rapid decline in health and usefulness regardless of the changes in social 
architecture.  After the excitement and challenge of initial formation wears off, the likelihood of 
“social loafing” increases (Wageman 1999; Williams et al. 1981).  Others may “free ride” by 
reaping the benefits of membership while decreasing their participation and commitments.  
While it is unclear from these data the extent to which this may have occurred, one of the main 
reasons the TBEP invested considerable time in negotiating the interlocal agreement and its 
binding commitments was to explicitly prevent this type of “free-riding” and “social loafing 
behavior.   
 
One of the advantages of using a historical perspective to view collaborative processes is 
that it enables you to better view and understand the changes occurring in the institutional 
environment surrounding these collaborative governance efforts.  Some of the waviness noted 
earlier is likely due to factors such as changes in funding availability and other macro-economic 
forces (e.g., the great recession).  The capacity for solving problems changes and interest shifts 
to new approaches to problem solving.  Problems that once motivated network participation get 
displaced as new issues command the attention of network members.  In short, network members 
increasingly view the network’s useful life in terms of the opportunity costs of their continued 
participation (Mandell and Keast 2008, 726).  As a result, network members may seek 
opportunities to achieve a greater return on their investments by deploying network resources 
elsewhere, perhaps in another governance network to address other landscape conservation 
problems.  Accordingly, some of bursts of activity and periods of quick decline also seem to be 
due to natural fluctuations in the external environment that create strategic opportunities and 
challenges in terms of finding funding to support the activities of the collaborative processes.   
 
It is also obvious that external actors can keep collaborative processes alive if they keep 
providing necessary resources, regardless of their actual health and usefulness.  In other words, 
you can clearly “buy” collaboration, but it also does not mean that the money is always well 
spent.  When comparing the CIB, NBEP, TBEP, and TEP it is important to recognize that all still 
receive considerable financial resources from the EPA and their state counterparts due to their 
participation in the National Estuary Program (NEP).  What would happen if this funding was 
terminated?  It is highly likely that the NBEP would cease to exist.  Despite repeated attempts to 
reorient and recreate itself, it remains relatively unhealthy and fails to provide much in the way 
of public value.  At the other end of the spectrum is the TBEP.  It would clearly exist without 
EPA funding and was built to have a sustaining source of local funding built into interlocal 
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agreement.  In fact, only about 25% of its funding comes from federal sources and it maintains a 
very healthy fund balance.  It is less clear what would happen with the CIB and TEP.  The CIB 
recently developed a finance plan that is oriented towards trying to ensure its sustainability and 
its funding sources are better diversified than the TEP.  The TEP situation is much more tenuous 
and heavily reliant on federal funding.  Accordingly, the CIB would be in a much better position 
to survive this funding loss.  Thus, EPA maintains a critical role in sustaining the survival of two 
of the four collaborative processes.   
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
It is easy to see why researchers conclude that collaborative governance is dynamic, 
challenging, time consuming, and fraught with difficulty (Bardach 1998; Johnston et al. 2010; 
Ospina & Saz-Carranza 2010; O’Leary & Bingham 2009).  When viewed over decades, it 
becomes easy to appreciate the dynamic nature of collaborative processes and how they evolve 
and change, only to occasionally die and be replaced by new efforts to address watershed 
problems.  Nurturing these collaborative processes through the different stages of development is 
not easy, nor is sustaining their usefulness over an extended period.   
 
There are also many paradoxical aspects of collaborative processes (e.g., (Ospina and 
Saz-Carranza 2010; Imperial 2005b).  The path-dependent nature of the convergence process 
reveals another paradoxical aspect of collaborative governance.  Networks are often formed 
based on a belief that they will be more “flexible” and “adaptive” to changing environmental 
conditions than more traditional forms of hierarchical organization (Imperial 1999a).  But, 
healthy and useful networks develop a relatively stable social architecture that is resistant to 
change in much that same way as other traditional hierarchical organizations.  However, they 
may provide a more “efficient” organizational response to problems by allocating available 
resources to address the shared problems that drive the formation of collaborative processes.  
This is due to the spontaneous order achieved when a structure emerges that allows its members 
to deploy resources in a coordinated fashion to achieve results that could not be achieved by 
working alone or at the direction of central hierarchical planning authority (Hayek 1945).   
 
The stability of the social architecture and the corresponding resistance to change or 
structural inertia, is not necessarily a symptom of “bad management”.  Quite the contrary, it may 
be a sign of a healthy and useful collaborative process that it is working well from the standpoint 
of those involved.  The stable structures noted in Figure 4 resulted from a well-tuned social 
architecture that utilizes the synergies among participating organizations for strategic purposes 
that advance the collective interests of its members (Kim et al., 2006, 705; Hannan & Freeman 
1984, 149).   
 
The findings also demonstrate that reorientations and recreations are risky.  There is no 
guarantee that an alternative network structure will produce better results as evidenced by the 
experiences in Narragansett Bay and Tillamook Bay.  More importantly, recreations can rob the 
network of its history and reset the “liability of newness” clock back to zero (Amburgey et al., 
1999, 53; Singh et al., 1986, 589; Hannan & Freeman 1984, 160; Stinchombe 1965).  When 
extended to networks, this suggests that new collaborative governance efforts have a higher 
propensity to die than older ones.  Empirical studies provide relatively consistent support for this 
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basic proposition in different organizational (e.g., Amburgey et al. 1993; Bruderl & Schussler 
1990; Gray & Ariss 1985; Singh et al., 1986; Freeman et al., 1983) and network settings (Koka 
et al., 2006; Burt 2002).  Indeed, this study provides further support for the notion that change is 
risky, particularly when it involves recreations as evidenced by the experiences in Narragansett 
and Tillamook Bay.  However, if the new collaborative process can converge on a new structure 
that gets the rules right, it can often endure for a long time as evidenced by the experiences in the 
Inland Bays and Tampa Bay.  The lesson is clear.  Change is risky but sometimes necessary.  
However, there is no guarantee that the new structure will prove more useful than the current 
one.  The development of the current structure required a significant investment of time and 
resources and participants and often recognize that building a new structure will incur high 
transaction costs.  Moreover, while the reorientations were typically viewed in positive terms, 
participants tend to view recreations (e.g., shift from the NBP to NBEP, shift from TCPP to TEP) 
in more negative terms.  Arguably, that explains why the EPA continued funding the NBEP for 
so long even though it was clearly trapped in a dysfunctional structure and could not be used for 
more productive purposes.   
 
While the study did not set out to examine the “death” of collaborative processes, a by-
product of the longitudinal perspective was the ability to identify some collaborations that ceased 
to exist for a variety of reasons.  In some instances, death was constructive.  Perhaps the best 
example are the various task forces or study commissions that focused on using a collaborative 
process to produce a report that elevated attention to watershed problems and provided 
recommendations to address them.  While they varied in terms of their usefulness (e.g., impact), 
there was often little reason for them to continue once their mission was complete.  Other deaths 
were less constructive.  While the Delaware Inland Bays Estuary Program (DIBEP) provided a 
great opportunity to address watershed problem, it led to the demise of the IBMC, which was 
quite useful.  It is interesting to ponder what would have happened instead if the resources 
provided by EPA in the Inland Bays had been allocated to the IBMC to continue its work.  
Similarly, while the collaborative processes associated with the development of the Section 208 
plans in the Inland Bays and Rhode Island were useful in identifying some innovative solutions 
to problems in the respective watersheds, the withdrawal of federal funds in 1981 led to a rather 
hasty demise.  Similarly, the IBSG and NERBC both suffered untimely deaths that cut short their 
useful lives.   
 
When viewed over time, there were also very few purely self-initiated collaborative 
processes that were not subject to some sort of internally or externally imposed constraints.  
However, in retrospect maybe this should have been expected given the nature of the problem 
and the federal system in which these collaborative processes operated.  Most government actors 
at the state and local level are subject to some higher order rules that place limits on what they 
can and cannot do, which in turn influences what any given combination of members of a 
collaborative partnership can accomplish.  To ensure stability, participants in collaborative 
processes frequently institutionalized rules at a constitutional-level (e.g., by-laws, interlocal 
agreement, legislation, articles of incorporation) to ensure that they are difficult to change and 
enhance legitimacy and stability (Imperial 2005a).  Collaborations also emerge because 
individually the members lack critical resources needed to address some watershed problem.  As 
a result, they are dependent on funding from other sources such as government, the private 
sector, or even a foundation.  However, funders impose constraints on what can or cannot be 
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done with these resources.  The consequence is that external actors establish critical rules via 
mandates (e.g., legislation, executive order) or through conditions of receiving funds (e.g., NEP 
planning grants), which shape the structure of a collaborative process.  As a result, collaborative 
governance clearly has a strong institutional orientation.  This requires not only understanding 
the choices that give configuration of rules inside the collaboration interact to shape its social 
architecture but also appreciating how the configuration or rules operating at higher levels 
outside the collaboration influences these choices and what it can or cannot accomplish.   
 
The large number of externally initiated collaborative processes also demonstrates that 
collaborative governance can be used as a policy tool as Scott and Thomas (2017) argue.  The 
experiences across the four watersheds also offer some guidance in terms of the use of this meta-
governance strategy.  Externally initiated efforts appear to work best when they are strategic, 
focused, and have a clear task or mission that is in alignment with the local context.  One of the 
problems with the National Estuary Program (NEP) is that it required a final plan that was truly 
“comprehensive” instead of letting participants develop a more “strategic” plan built around a set 
of shared goals or objectives to stimulate action.  The results suggest that external processes 
work best when there is a lot of flexibility in terms of crafting rules.  The EPA required 
consensus and a collaborative process with lots of involvement with decision making typically 
being driven by larger management committees comprised of agency and stakeholder 
representatives.  This combination of rules worked well in Tillamook Bay but fostered a highly 
dysfunctional process in Narragansett Bay.  In the Inland Bays, reaching “consensus” involved 
negotiating to the lowest common denominator as it was much harder to reach agreement on 
some issues, which disappointed some participants.  Tampa Bay, which was arguably the most 
healthy and productive of the four processes, instead opted for a much more highly engaged 
policy committee that placed primary decision-making authority in the hands of 6 local 
governments and 3 agencies so that they could negotiate clear goals and targets.  However, this 
process was arguably less inclusive that the others.   
 
The lesson in terms of using mandates or incentives to initiate collaborative process is 
that imposing any set of standardized rules is problematic because the configuration of rules has 
to “fit” the local context.  Each watershed had a history that generated some norms and 
expectations among members in terms of how they go about solving collaborative problems.  
Tampa Bay approached the NEP as it had other regional issues.  However, the NEP was a very 
different approach to problem solving in the Inland Bays and Tillamook Bay.  Interestingly, 
when their plans were completed they both returned to structures that resembled prior structures.  
Conversely, there appears to be a mismatch of scale in Narragansett Bay.  There is a much richer 
history of collaborative governance efforts than is depicted in Table 3.  However, most of these 
are targeted at different regions (i.e., sub-basins) within the watershed have clearly defined 
problems that motivate state and local participation in collaborative problem-solving processes 
(Imperial, et al. 2017).  The larger watershed simply lacks that central organizing issue or 
problem.  Flexibility in terms of selecting key rules appears to be critical.   
 
Another problem with using external mandates or incentives to initiate collaboration is 
the problem of a time commitment.  One of the interesting things the Governor of Delaware did 
was to use an executive order to establish the GTFIB with a clear mission – produce a report 
with recommendations, and rather quickly.  The Governor then established the IBMC to oversee 
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implementation for a designated period (i.e., 5 years) with the promise of some financial support.  
The predictability of funding and a designated timeframe for action was a useful strategy because 
participants had clear expectations in terms of the time and resource commitments as well as 
some urgency to address the 41 recommendations in the GTFIB report.  Contrast that strategy 
with the NEP where it continued to provide implementation funding to all four programs even 
though some of their “CCMPs” were more than a decade old and way out of date.  As previously 
noted, the steady supply of funding arguably kept the NBEP alive for over two decades with an 
unhealthy collaborative process.  However, during the same period, several very healthy and 
useful collaborative processes emerged on a much smaller scale within the watershed to address 
pressing problems (Imperial, et al. 2017).  Keeping an effort like the NBEP alive past its healthy 
and useful life is unproductive.  While it allows the EPA to keep a watershed on a map, provides 
green pork, and allows the agency to claim it is working to address the watershed’s problems, it 
simultaneously traps state and local resources in an unproductive process that could be allocated 
to address the problems in other collaborations within the watershed.  Similarly, while the NBEP 
continues to occupy this institutional space, no other collaborative effort is likely to emerge for 
the watershed.  The same is true for the other three watersheds because it is unlikely that a 
competing watershed level initiative would emerge.   
 
The Section 208 program provides another cautionary tale.  This mandate stimulated 
countless collaborative planning processes around the country.  Some of these plans had truly 
innovative ideas and recommendations including the one developed for Narragansett Bay 
(Imperial, et al. 2017).  However, implementation efforts withered because the planning and 
implementation efforts were poorly funded and eventually funding was terminated in 1981.  The 
lesson is that you can clearly use a mandate to cause 100s of gardens to be planted but why do 
that in the first place if you turn off the water and let everything that started growing die before 
anyone eats the vegetables.  Accordingly, while collaborative governance can function as a 
policy tool and obviously can be used to initiate collaborative processes via a mandate or 
incentive structure, the implications of its use and the consequences of making structural design 
choices should be considered carefully.   
 
The path-dependent nature of the convergence process also suggests that all participants 
in a collaborative process, whether it is self-initiated or stimulated externally, should carefully 
consider design choices.  Similarly, when undertaking reorientations and recreations it is 
important to be deliberative about rules choices and how they will interact to create a reifying 
structure.  Tampa Bay provides the best example of an effort to “get the rules right”.  Its 
members had a lot of experience (good and bad) working in other collaborative processes and 
were determined to ensure that the plan, and more importantly its goals, did not end up on some 
shelf gathering dust.  They engaged the services of facilitators and began negotiating what would 
eventually become a binding interlocal agreement.  This investment paid dividends as the 
structure still operates largely as it did when the agreement was adopted a little more than 20 
years ago.  This was not always the case.  It was common to find that some rules and aspects of 
the structure emerged, often with little thought.  For example, Narragansett Bay created three 
subcommittees that were subsequently abolished and folded into their management committee 
because they lacked a clear purpose and met infrequently.  The example begs the question about 
why they were created in the first place, but no one seems to know. 
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These data support the argument that it is important to be deliberative when it comes to 
selecting rules and to think about how they interact to shape collaborative processes.  It takes 
time to get the rules right and these processes often take longer than its participants or external 
funders like EPA like, but the collaborative processes seem to be most healthy and useful when 
they develop at their own pace.  It also requires participants and support staff who understand the 
dynamics of collaborative processes.  That was not always the case (e.g., Narragansett Bay and 
Tillamook Bay).  To return to the architectural metaphor, anyone can start building a house.  An 
experienced builder will probably do a better job than someone who has never worked in 
construction.  However, the advantage to working with an architect and engineer to design the 
structure is that they have expertise that even an experienced builder lacks in terms of ensuring 
the structure is safe, built to last, and that the space is functional and designed to serve its 
intended purposes.  Many of the watershed partnerships noted in Table 3 that experienced 
problems lacked experienced builders let alone an architects or engineers. 
 
Unfortunately, there is much left to be learned about how the configuration of rules 
interacts to provide structure to collaborative processes.  Given the institutional rational choice 
literature, it is unlikely that a configuration of rules would prove to always be more “effective”.  
Nevertheless, we remain a long way from understanding whether certain “structures” are better 
for deploying certain collaborative “tools” or achieving certain purposes (Prentice, et al. 2019). 
We do know is that it is highly unlikely that one “rule” (e.g., consensus decision making, level of 
inclusiveness) is always better.  We know that rules can create a favorable environment for 
productive interactions or become obstacles (Mandell & Steelman 2003, 217).  The cases also 
suggest that getting the rules “right” also involves the challenge of fitting the local context.  It 
also seems to require having some understanding what the shared goal, problem, or purpose is 
that will motivate and sustain a commitment to the effort during the activation stage.  The 
advantage of the framework of boundary, decision, and coordination rules presented in this paper 
is that it provides a way for participants to carefully consider and deliberate the design choices 
that go into crafting the social architecture.   
 
The findings also demonstrate that changing structures to get the rules “right” is just one 
aspect of the nurturing needed to ensure the health and useful life of a collaborative process 
[Table 5].  Fortunately, we are beginning to understand quite a bit about strategies that can be 
used to nurture healthy and usable network processes (e.g., Johnston et al. 2010; Ospina & Foldy 
2015, 2010; Ospina & Saz-Carranza 2010; Saz-Carranza & Ospina 2010).  Different nurturing 
strategies also appear to be appropriate during different stages of the developmental process 
(Imperial et al. 2016a).  Failure to engage in proper nurturing allows the social architecture to 
break down in ways that reduce the usefulness of network processes.  Some of the waviness in 
otherwise stable processes noted earlier is likely due to participants taking collaborative 
processes for granted and forgetting that they need constant attention.  Moreover, changes in 
support staff, leadership, and resource allocations also appear to contribute to variations in how 
much time is allocated to nurturing to support the health and usefulness of the collaborative 
process.   
 
Healthy and useful network structures are also formed to “fit” the needs of network 
members at any given point in time.  However, needs change as does the broader 
interorganizational and social, political, and economic system within which a collaborative 
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process develops.  To return to the architectural metaphor you may own a home that is perfectly 
suited to family needs.  However, the addition of two new children, a live-in parent, or a home-
based business may reduce the usefulness of the current structure.  In some cases, this problem is 
solved through an addition or a reallocation of living space (i.e., reorientation).  It may also 
require building a major addition or finding a new home that is better suited to current needs 
(i.e., recreation).  Similarly, reorientations and recreations are necessary from time to time to 
address changing needs or expectations.  However, participants may resist changing a structure 
that is working, even when its usefulness is declining because change is risky and time 
consuming.  Ironically, in unhealthy processes, the breakdown in the social architecture can 
facilitate reorientations and recreations because members become less commited to a structure 
that no longer appears to be working.  However, this is analogous to waiting to let a garden die 
and then replanting another in its place.  While it is withering, resources are trapped that could be 
put to a more productive purpose.  Thus, network members should embrace reorientations and 
recreations as being a critical part of sustaining healthy and useful collaborative processes. 
 
Finally, the concept of a healthy and useful life draws attention to the functional and 
strategic nature of collaborative governance.  It emerges to presumably fulfill some purpose that 
cannot be achieved by actors working alone (Imperial, et al. 2018).  The change in dialog also 
emphasizes that even when networks are disbanded, they may still have had useful lives.  The 
paper provides several notable examples.  The study also demonstrates that while many 
collaborative processes are designed to endure for a long time, that need not be the case.  When 
the useful life of the collaborative process declines, it is time to disband, reorient, or recreate the 
network to allow network resources to be redeployed in new ways.  Unfortunately, many 
participants appear reluctant to think in those terms.  Instead, they escalate their commitment to 
prolong a collaborative process whose useful lives are marked by prolonged decline.  Our hope is 
that reorientations and recreations are viewed in more beneficial terms.  While collaborative 
processes are best left to develop at their own pace, they should also die when their useful life 
has passed to free up scarce resources and put them to more productive purposes (Imperial et al. 
2016a).   
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